Comparative Irish HistoriansPadraig Lenihan and Tadhg O'hAnnrachain Discuss the Irish Civil War
A look at Padraig Lenihan and Tadhg O'hAnnrachain's discussion of the Irish Confederate War, including outside influence, strategy and other topics.
The Irish Confederate War has consistently been discussed by historians in terms of the military strategy employed, the roles of the Generals, and the style of fighting, among other things. James Scott Wheeler, Padraig Lenihan and Tadhg O’hAnnrachain focus on many of these topics throughout their works both in agreement and in juxtaposition to each other. Wheeler approaches this topic from the value-free, objective historiographical tradition, while Lenihan and O’hAnnrachain take a decidedly nationalist approach. This can be seen in their discussion of Rinuccini, the papal nuncio, who is often portrayed as the cause of the disunity within the Irish Confederate army and the reason for the defeat of the Irish.[1] Lenihan and O’hAnnrachain do not believe Rinuccini’s role in the war was entirely without strife but they do not see him as the sole cause of the Confederate army’s defeat. Rinuccini's Influence on the WarThe importance of Rinuccini to the war, however, is one area they do not agree on, as Lenihan believes that Rinuccini did abuse the power given to him and used it to influence the Confederate army, aligning himself with the more traditionalist, value-free approach.[2] O’hAnnrachain, however, believes that Rinuccini was motivated by a more virtuous desire - to serve the religious community.[3] The Irish Confederate Army and StrategyThe discussion of Rinuccini is not the only area in which Lenihan and O’hAnnrachain do not find completely common ground. Lenihan believes that the Confederate Army had several strategies for the war which were inherently connected and which were both feasible, while O’hAnnrachain believes that the Confederate forces had a strategy but it was outside influence which caused the Confederate army to fail, including Catholic Europe, as well as France, Spain and the Vatican, who were the three European powers giving aid to the Irish.[4] Though they might not agree on the reasons for the Irish army’s failure, they do complement each and work with each other, noticeable when O’hAnnrachain directly references Lenihan’s work which he believes that the invaluable military lessons the Irish exiles learned were both to the benefit and the hindrance of the Irish Confederate army.[5] Lenihan and O’hAnnrachain show that the main cause of defeat for the Irish was the inability of the Confederate army to unify, poor planning and strategy, and poor policy making, as previously believed. Despite their agreement with the traditional historiographical approach, their careful analysis of both primary and secondary sources provide alternative ideas and explanations for the military victories, defeats and struggles in Ireland during the war. Sources: [1] S.J. Connolly, Oxford Companion to Irish History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 513. [2] Lenihan, "Confederate Military Strategy, 1643-1647", 165. [3] O’hAnnrachain, "Disrupted and Disruptive: continental influence on the confederate catholics of Ireland", 149. [4]Lenihan, 159 and O’hAnnrachain, 137. [5] O’hAnnrachain, 135.
The copyright of the article Comparative Irish Historians in UK/Irish History is owned by Christie Schneck. Permission to republish Comparative Irish Historians in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.
Related Articles
Related Topics
Reference
More in History
|